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Abstract 
“Community energy” is a highly contested issue not only in the German energy transition 
governance but also in the recent legislative procedure to recast energy market legislation 
within the EU’s “Winter Package”.  
This paper analyses effects of the German provisions to privilege “community energy ac-
tors” against the background of the objectives of the revised German renewable energy 
policy. It finds that the results of these provisions for community energy actors in the German 
auction scheme do not just represent an acceptable level of losses due to recognized trade-
offs between the three main objectives – controlled RE expansion, actor plurality and cost 
efficiency – but instead a complete failure with regard to all three of these objectives. 
The paper suggests to clearly distinguish between the risks for small actors to take part in 
auctions from the added value, provided by these actors. This approach will help to define 
the necessary policy design elements that are suitable to enable small and community energy 
actors to participate in energy market activities, to provide the politically desired benefits, 
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“Community energy” is a highly contested issue not only in the German energy transition 
governance but also in the recent legislative procedure to recast energy market legislation 
within the EU’s “Winter Package”.  
In Germany, “community energy actors” significantly pushed the deployment of renewable 
energies in the past. In the course of the shift of the support scheme for renewable energies 
from a price-based feed-in tariff to a volume-based competitive auction, the German 
Government for the first time legally defined the term “citizens’ energy companies”. This 
term was officially established in order to select those energy actors who were privileged by 
special auction rules. These special rules were justified by the policy objectives to enhance 
actor plurality and societal acceptance of the energy transition.  
The paper analyses effects of the German provisions to privilege “community energy actors” 
against the background of the objectives of the revised German renewable energy policy. It 
finds that the results of these provisions for community energy actors in the German auction 
scheme do not just represent an acceptable level of losses due to recognized trade-offs 
between the three main objectives – controlled RE expansion, actor plurality and cost 
efficiency – but instead a complete failure with regard to all three of these objectives. 
The paper takes a closer look at the motivations that officially underpinned these special 
provisions for citizens’ energy actors in order to draw lessons from that policy pilot. These 
lessons might also help other European countries implementing the envisaged EU energy 
market legislation in the future. It suggests that member states have “[…] to put in place an 
enabling framework to promote and facilitate participation by renewable energy 
communities in the generation, consumption, storage and sale of renewable energy” 
(European Parliament 2018, article 22(2a)). 
The paper suggests to clearly distinguish between the risks for small actors to take part in 
auctions from the added value, provided by these actors. This approach will help to define 
the necessary policy design elements that are suitable to enable small and community energy 
actors to participate in energy market activities, to provide the politically desired benefits, 
and to prevent disastrous policy failures similar to those in the German case.  
2 “Community energy” in the German energy policy context 
2.1 Occasion: instrumental shift in the support scheme for renewables 
The term “community energy” or “citizens’ energy” entered the political agenda in the 
course of the debate on the shift of the national support scheme for renewable energy (RE). 
In 2014, the German government decided to switch from a price-based to a volume-based 
support scheme for renewable energy. This fundamental instrumental shift was “forced” by 
external pressure (EU-Commission’s State aid guidelines, European Commission 2014) on the 
one side, but also by domestic debates about the affordability of the energy transition and 




the increasing costs of RE deployment on the other side (for more details on drivers and 
implications of this instrumental shift, see Tews 2015). 
The price-based support scheme for RE – the so-called feed-in-tariff – functioned as a shelter, 
allowing small-scale renewable electricity producers to develop in a niche. These new actors 
have challenged established patterns of domestic energy policy interaction through 
experimentation and innovation at a decentralized level (Beermann and Tews 2017). 
According to a survey carried out by trend:research GmbH and the Leuphana Universität 
Lüneburg (2013) nearly half (46.6 percent) of the total RE capacity installed in Germany was 
owned by citizens and collective citizens’ energy initiatives before the introduction of the 
auction scheme. It has been argued by many scientists and proponents of this “bottom-up” 
energy transition that these new energy actors are not purely driven by maximum profit-
seeking motives (e.g. Holstenkamp et al. 2018). Instead, they combine their engagement in 
energy business with a common good orientation in terms of local development, inclusive 
democracy, citizens’ engagement and social innovation.  
2.2 Risk of auction schemes and measures of the German government to counter 
these risks 
Many stakeholders perceived the instrumental shift as a serious threat for a further 
engagement of these new energy actors who have driven the transition in Germany thus far. 
Various empirical studies pointed to the risks of auction schemes (i.e. Ecofys 2014; IZES 
2014; Grashof et al. 2015). Auctions would disadvantage local small-scale investors, as they 
are less able to diversify risks related to the uncertainty of successful bids and to cover 
higher transaction costs associated with the participation in auctions. In addition to the loss 
of actor plurality, these studies have pointed to various other risks. They comprise the threat 
of spatial concentration of generation facilities (hotspots) and the respective high burdens 
on the grid infrastructure, innovation barriers due to the exclusion of less mature RE 
technologies as well as the risks of low actual project implementation rates, as 
demonstrated by the experiences of auction schemes in other countries. Low 
implementation rates would in fact threaten the main purpose of a volume-based and 
competitive coordination mode for RE development: the cost-effective achievement of the 
politically determined annual RE expansion targets. 
These other risks were discussed during consultations and the German government 
introduced various legal provisions into the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) to counter these 
risks.  
a) The “reference yield model”, for example, was adapted in order to prevent hotspots 
in particularly wind-intensive geographical areas. It aims to enable wind energy plants 
to operate throughout the federal territory by remunerating at different rates, 
depending on location. However, the actual bid in a given tender has to refer to an 
administratively defined reference site in order to make the calculated prices of the 
competing bids comparable.  




b) The German government additionally opted for technology specific tenders to counter 
the risk of blocking further development of (less mature) RE technology and to 
safeguard diversification of the RE sources. The recent results of the first pilot auction 
round combining wind and PV verified the relevance of this approach. All awards in 
this combined pilot tender went to PV-based bids (Bundesnetzagentur 2018a).  
c) The core approach to handle the risk of low implementation rates and, thus, to miss 
the expansion targets was the concept of “late” auctions. “Late” refers to the point 
in time of the development process of a given wind energy project. As a rule, the 
construction permit (grant of approval pursuant to the Federal Immission Control Act, 
BImSchG) is a central pre-qualification to participate in a tender. Granting this 
construction permit is a complex process, as all potential environmental impacts of 
the specific planned wind turbine/park have to be considered. This process requires 
time, knowledge and capacities, i.e. it induces a high amount of transaction costs. 
Having passed this process successfully can be assessed as an indicator for a high 
propensity of actual implementation of the awarded bids. The short implementation 
deadlines of maximum 2.5 years aim additionally at achieving expansion targets 
without delay.  
Particularly, the knowledge about the political intention of conceptualizing “late” auctions, 
i.e. to guarantee high and timely implementation rates, also helps to understand the implicit 
assumptions underpinning the special regulation for citizens’ energy companies. It will also 
help us to evaluate the impact of that special regulation according to the empirical results 
of the auction schemes in Germany as will be presented in the following sections.  
2.3 Legal definition and special provisions for citizens’ energy companies 
During the debate on the revision of the EEG, the German government repeatedly declared 
that it will pursue actor plurality in its future energy transition efforts and will not threaten 
regional and local efforts towards a low-carbon energy transition. Confronted with the 
results of the pilot bidding rounds on ground mounted PV (2014 –2016), which verified the 
concerns regarding a loss of actor plurality and the exclusion of small players1, the 
government introduced special regulations in order to create a level playing field for local 
citizen-based energy companies related to wind specific tenders.  
2.3.1 Definition of “Citizens’ energy”  
The revised EEG – adopted in 2016 and entered into force in January 2017 – for the first time 
legally defined the term “citizens’ energy”.  
 
                                             
 
1  The majority of the capacity awarded went to bidders with more than one bid and bidders who feature 
intercompany ties with other successful bidders (see Beermann and Tews 2017).  




§ 3 EEG 2017 defines a citizens’ energy company as an entity, 
• “which consists of at least ten natural persons with voting right 
• in which at least 51 percent of the voting rights are held by natural persons which live in 
the urban or rural district in which the onshore wind energy installation is to be erected,  
• in which no member or shareholder of the undertaking holds more than 10 percent of 
the voting rights of the undertaking” (EEG 20172)  
§ 36g EEG 2017 furthermore defines, that  
• members or shareholders are not allowed to have concluded contracts to transfer shares 
or voting rights in order to circumvent provision of § 3; 
• in the case of a successful bid, a 10 percent financial stake has to be offered to the 
municipality, where the installation is erected; 
• The scale of the bid is restricted: up to six wind turbines or a maximum capacity of 18 
MW (ibid.).  
However, community energy or citizens’ energy is not a uniform phenomenon. Literature 
offers a variety of terms, characteristics, narratives which represent different theoretical 
approaches and ideational concepts (e.g. Holstenkamp 2018:897). The German 
Government’s approach to legally define those actors that are eligible to benefit from the 
special legal provisions tried to operationalize particularly the following characteristics:  
a) small scale nature and limited number of projects;  
b) citizens’ control and  
c) locality of investments and returns.  
The motivations underlying this set of criteria were to counteract small players’ risk of 
having to bear up-front costs without guarantees to win auctions, and their limited 
opportunity to diversify this risk through multiple projects. An additional and related 
motivation was to buttress acceptance of the local population via the local embeddedness 
of investors. Thus, the target of the special provisions was to create a level playing field for 
these actors in an imperfect market mainly for competition concerns.   
Furthermore, successful bids by citizens’ energy companies are awarded according to the 
uniform pricing principle3 in contrast to pay-as-bid principle for “ordinary” bidders.  
                                             
 
2  Informal English version of the EEG 2017, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/E/eeg-2017-
gesetz-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8 
3  i.e. the value of the award for bids of citizens energy companies shall be the value of the award of the highest 
bid awarded in the respective auction round. 




2.3.2 Special auctioning rules for citizens’ energy companies  
§ 36g of the EEG 2017 defines those special rules, which solely apply to citizens’ energy 
companies (CEC). They are intended to provide the necessary level playing field for these 
actors to participate in auctions. The most relevant provisions comprise  
a) the allowance to submit a bid before the granting of the construction permit 
(pursuant to the Federal Immission Control Act (§36g(1)), and   
b) the allowance of longer realisation times for project implementation of up to 4.5 
years compared to 2.5 years for “ordinary” bidders (§36g(2)). 
These exceptional provisions can be perceived as a fundamental derivation from the core 
principle of the German auction scheme – the principle of “late” tenders. Having in mind 
the underpinning motivation of “late” tenders – safeguarding target achievement – it 
becomes clear that the legislator implicitly assumed citizens’ energy as a rather small 
segment among the potential bidders.  
3 Impact of special regulation for citizens’ energy companies: 
evidence from the German auction scheme 
3.1 Success of citizens’ energy? 
In contrast to any expectation and to many concerns of citizens’ energy advocates about 
potential shortcomings of the EEG’s provisions for citizens’ energy, the results of the first 
auction in May 2017 surprised with an overwhelming success of bidders that made use of the 
special rules for citizens’ energy companies. The privileges for CEC, conceptualized as 
exceptions, became the rule in the market “game”. 
Shocked by this unintended result which seriously threatened the achievement of the 
planned RE expansion and climate targets, the German Bundestag immediately announced 
a moratorium regarding § 36g(1) and stopped the possibility for CEC to offer a bid before the 
construction permit has been granted. However, this moratorium took force only for the 
fourth and fifth auction rounds in 2018, before a final adaptation of the EEG will be 
implemented. Consequently, also in the second and third auction round in 2017, citizens’ 
energy companies won almost all of the awards (see Figure 1). 
How to interpret these results? Do they represent the legislator’s failure to assess ex-ante 
the strength and volume of the citizens’ energy segment? Or, did the legal definition not 
suffice to address the intended actors – citizens which initiate on their own wind energy 
projects in their neighborhood? Or, is the privilege offered to citizens’ energy companies so 
economically attractive that even professional energy actors altered their projects into 
projects which fit with the legal definition of a CEC-project? Or is there something 
inconsistent within the whole policy design? 




Figure 1:   Results of the first 5 bidding rounds on onshore wind in 2017/2018 
  
Source: Author’s figure based on data from Bundesnetzagentur  
3.2 CEC as business model for rational economic actors 
The press release of the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) regarding the results 
of the first auction round in May 2017 (Bundesnetzagentur 2017a) rather neutrally reported 
the success of citizens’ energy. The press release following the second bidding round already 
revealed the Agency’s awareness about the character of the successful CEC bidders: “The 
majority of the awards for bids of citizens’ energy companies go to companies whose bids 
make it clear that they are at least organisationally assigned to a single project developer” 
(author’s translation of the press release, Bundesnetzagentur 2017b).  
The single project developer mentioned in the press release – the Saxonian UKA-Group – is 
according to data from 2016 the second biggest developer of on-shore wind energy project 
in Germany. In an interview for the magazine “Erneuerbare Energien” in November 2017 the 
company’s managing partner, Gernot Gauglitz, publicly explained the company’s strategy as 
the most adaptive business model to comply with the induced competitive pressure in the 
German auction scheme (Erneuerbare Energien 2017). According to him, UKA was forced to 
emulate the behaviour of other project developers that won in the first bidding round, where 
UKA failed to win any of its “ordinary” bids. The adaptation of its strategy was so successful 
that UKA-connected CEC dominated the second bidding round with a 68 percent share of the 
total awarded volume (see Table 1). 
 























































































other bidders CEC with construction permit CEC without construction permit awarded price on average (in ct/kWh)
Result of the first three bidding rounds in 2017: 
Ca. 95 % of the auctioned volume (2.820 MW) was awarded to 
bidders without a construction permit and with long implementation 
deadlines up to 54 months (§36g EEG 2017) 
Risk to miss the German annual exansion RE targets 




Table 1: Results of the second bidding round 2018: A single player’s dominance 
Total number 
of awards 
Awards for CEC Awards for UKA-connected CEC-
bidders 
Share UKA of total 
number of awards 





Awarded volume for UKA-
connected CEC-bidders 
Share UKA of total 
awarded volume 
1013 MW 958 MW 690 MW 68% 
Source:  Author’s compilation based on data from Bundesnetzagentur (2017b, 2018b) and Erneuerbare Energie 
(2017). 
In sum, the successful bidders privileged as CEC were set up by a very small number of 
professional project developers, who do not act as shareholders or members of the CEC – 
according to the legal definition – but as general contractors or service providers4.   
In fact, those project developers, who transformed their projects into CEC-projects made 
use of the privileges for CEC:  
- to take part in the bidding procedure without having a construction permit, and  
- the longer time span between awards and realisation deadline (up to 4.5 years). 
These provisions offered opportunities for underbidding other “ordinary” bidders, a well–
known phenomenon of competitive auction schemes. The exceptions – intended to support 
a small segment of rather unprofessional citizen-based projects – were used by typical 
business actors in an economically rational way. They calculated their expected returns 
(bids) with more effective wind turbines which according to their market analyses will only 
be developed in the near future. Thus, these special provisions for CEC have been used by 
professional actors to an extent that devaluated all existing construction permits for wind 
energy projects, as these permissions always have to relate to a specific type of an available 
wind turbine technology (Herrmann 2017: 4). 
In sum, it can be stated that professional project developers, like UKA, have carefully 
analysed the market as well as the political framework conditions, and have rationally 
adapted their business model. The CEC connected with these project developers meet all 
legal requirements of a CEC. Thus, the frequently expressed complaint, it would be “fake”5 
                                             
 
4    A brief analysis of data of the Bundesnetzagentur and the trade register about the winners of the second 
round revealed that a lot of the successful CEC were formally founded just a few days before the auction 
deadline. They also have similar names, for example “Umweltgerechte Bürgerenergie”, and – although the 
planned erection site is located in different municipalities - the registered office of those formally distinct 
CEC is the same and situated in the Saxonian town Meißen, identical with the postal address of UKA. 
5  The German newspaper “Die Welt” headlined for example in June 2017: “The dirty tricks with citizens’ 
energy” (author’s translation); https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article165807760/Die-schmutzige-
Trickserei-mit-der-Buergerenergie.htm 




CEC that won the awards does suggest a knowledge, what “real” CEC is. Unfortunately, 
“real” CEC is not clearly defined – neither in scientific literature nor in the definition of 
citizens’ energy in the EEG.  
3.3 Evaluation: total failure regarding the intended triangle of objectives 
As almost 95 % of the auctioned volume in 2017 was awarded to bidders without a 
construction permit, it is doubtful how many of these projects will actually be realised. This 
results in uncertainty whether one core element of the instrumental shift – the volume-based 
approach to steer RE expansion – can be actually achieved. Additionally, the longer 
implementation deadlines of up to 54 months for these projects indicate that most of them 
– if ever – will not be realised before the year 2020. According to the Green Party in the 
German parliament, this would cause a sharp decline of the annual expansion of wind energy 
in Germany to 1500 MW or less in 2019 and 2020 compared with 5000 MW per year in 2016 
and 2017. Moreover this would imply missing the German and the mandatory European 
renewable energy targets (Deutscher Bundestag 2018).  
The wind energy industry is complaining tremendously about these results as they represent 
a serious threat to their business model: uncertainties regarding the actual demand of wind 
turbines and/or the expected delay of the installation of wind turbines that is assumed to 
create a serious investment gap for the wind energy industry (Herrmann 2017: 4).  
As explained above, the auctions were not able to foster actor plurality, the second core 
objective of the specific provisions, either. Instead, a small number of professional project 
developers dominated. 
What about cost efficiency, the third objective of the German volume-based auction scheme 
and the core argument of proponents of competitive approaches6 to determine the price for 
RE? 
At first glance, Error! Reference source not found. obviously illustrates a considerable 
decrease in the average price per kWh of wind energy in the first three bidding rounds, from 
5.71 Ct/kWh to 3.82 Ct/kWh. The remuneration that would have been paid according to the 
previous administratively fixed feed-in-tariff (EEG 2014) would be – nominally averaged – 
6.16 Ct/kWh for plants erected at the beginning of 2018 (Berkhout et al. 2018). Thus, it was 
claimed by the government that this core objective was reached by the German auction 
scheme. 
However, the price results presented in Figure 1 are determined by the calculated prices of 
the bids, not the actual remuneration as defined in the above-mentioned reference yield 
                                             
 
 
6  Many economists favor auctions over feed-in tariffs because of its price determination mechanism that is 
assumed more cost-efficient. Auction are preferred due to the competitive determination instead of the 
administrative determination of the price in the feed-in tariff-scheme.   




model. The actual remuneration is on different rates, depending on the wind situation at 
the erection site7.  
Researchers of the German Fraunhofer Institute IEE and IZES have questioned the alleged 
cost-cutting effect (Berkhout et al. 2018). They simulated a comparison of remunerations 
based on the previous price-based support scheme and the results of the current volume-
based support scheme by considering the reference yield model – i.e. the wind-quality at 
the erection site of the awarded CEC projects in the first three bidding rounds in 2017. They 
discovered up to one-fourth higher costs of the awards for CEC projects in the first bidding 
round compared to the previous remuneration based on the feed-in tariff scheme. Only the 
results of the third bidding round have shown a 10 percent reduction of the level of 
remuneration compared to the previous system (ibid.). Keeping in mind that these prices 
were a result of the very specific underbidding approach of successful bidders incentivized 
by the special provisions of §36g, the magnitude of this decrease can be seriously questioned. 
The subsequent increase in the average prices per kWh after the moratorium took force in 
2018 confirms this assessment (see Figure 1). Energy experts had expected this price increase 
(Berkhout et al. 2018). All bidders with construction permits, including the unsuccessful 
bidders of the first three rounds, had to calculate their bids based on the available wind 
technology and no longer needed to adjust their bids to the expected underbidding strategy 
of privileged bidders without permits.   
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
What kind of lessons can we draw from this severe policy failure to meet the intended 
objectives?  
The German legislator has integrated secondary policy objectives – a geographically more 
balanced distribution of wind energy plants and actor plurality – into an economic 
instrument, which mainly addresses the economic efficiency of the price building process. A 
trade-off with the economic efficiency objective of the auction scheme was – according to 
the justification of the German auction design (Deutscher Bundestag 2016:147) – politically 
accepted. Such trade-offs are quite common outcomes of political processes, whose 
protagonists have to find compromises between interdependent policy objectives.  
4.1 Inadequate integration of secondary objectives  
However, the results of the German auction scheme do not represent a more or less 
acceptable level of assumed losses due to recognized trade-offs between the three main 
                                             
 
7  The awarded projects of the auctions in 2017 are planned to be erected at locations of a middle wind quality 
of 90% (first bidding round) or 85 % (second and third bidding round) of the wind quality at the standard 
reference side. (Berkhout et al. 2018). That means that actual remuneration payments will be higher than 
prices calculated for the bids. 




objectives of controlled RE expansion, actor plurality and cost efficiency. Instead, we see a 
complete failure with regard to all of these three objectives (see above). 
There might be economists that feel confirmed in their assessment that any intervention 
into a market would be a market distortion and should therefore be avoided. However, the 
renewable energy market would not exist without state intervention and a piecemeal 
criticism of (presumed) market distortion would be the wrong lesson from the German 
“disastrous” policy pilot to create a level playing field for new citizens-based energy actors. 
A closer look at the policy motivation underlying the definition of citizens’ energy companies 
and the relation between these motivations and their operationalisation might give us more 
insights to draw adequate lessons. 
Integrating the objective of “actor plurality” into the policy design of the German auctions 
scheme was motivated by, first, purely competition concerns to prevent market dominance 
of a few big energy actors (ibid.). This challenge was met by general provisions that may 
counteract the risks of small actors – e.g. a generalized de-minimis threshold of 750 kW. 
However, the German legislator additionally defined an enabling policy framework for 
certain small actors to participate in wind energy auctions. The sole argument to explain 
that specific focus on citizen-based energy companies can be derived from the official 
justification of §36g EEG 2017: “In particular, locally anchored citizen energy companies 
have made a significant contribution to the necessary acceptance of new on-shore wind 
energy projects. Without this acceptance, the expansion of wind energy cannot be achieved 
in the planned amount“(author’s translation, Deutscher Bundestag 2016: 217). 
However, if citizens’ energy is perceived by the legislator as the provider of the necessary 
acceptance of wind energy expansion, than it seems to be inconsequential, that the citizens’ 
energy segment was implicitly conceptualized as just a small segment among the potential 
bidders. To reiterate, all the special rules for CEC are a fundamental derivation from the 
core principle of the German “late” auction design (see section 2.3.2).  
4.2 The need to decouple multiple motives  
A possible approach to learn from these failures is to distinguish clearly between the two 
motivations underlying the objective “actor plurality”. The first one addresses the risks of 
small actors, and the second one addresses the added value provided by citizen energy 
actors. Decoupling these two motivations might be helpful to find an adequate policy design. 
4.2.1 Addressing the risks of small actors  
If design elements are supposed to help to safeguard market access for small actors for 
competition concerns, then the very specific risks of small actors must be addressed. This 
could be realized either with support measures outside of the auction, e.g. by providing 
counselling during preparation of a bid, or by exempting small actors from auctions 
altogether. Currently, the German generalized de-minimis threshold for exemptions from 
competitive tendering is at 750 kW. But this threshold has in fact no relevance for wind 




energy projects, as the market standard of available wind turbines is above this threshold 
at 2.5 to 3 MW on average. The German Government rejected to use the full room for 
maneuver to exempt smaller projects from tendering which has been given by the European 
Commission state aid guidelines. According to the EU Competition Commissioner's 
clarification from January 2016 about the misleading formulation of the de-minimis rule for 
wind power in the state aid guidelines, there is a possibility of “exemption from the 
competitive tendering requirement [...] for wind projects with a maximum of 18 MW 
installed power”(author’s translation of the answer of Competition Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager to the German Federal Wind Association)8. 
4.2.2 Addressing the added value attributed to community energy actors 
However, if acceptance is the determining criterion, then we need to look in more detail at 
what in fact contributes to societal acceptance, as the legislator did not specify sufficiently, 
why citizen energy actors have significantly contributed to this objective. The items 
“majority of natural persons” of the members or shareholders of the CEC and their “place 
of residence” in the district of the planned wind energy plant have been used to 
operationalize characteristics of citizen-based energy actors and local embeddedness. Both 
characteristics are often linked in the literature with acceptance issues (e.g. Hauser et al. 
2015).  
Yet, it is not too difficult to imagine that ten individual citizens who invest in a joint local 
economic undertaking can also act in a purely egoistic manner, i.e. without taking into 
account economic welfare or social acceptance in their neighborhood in a more caring 
manner than other economic actors. The acceptance issue, thus, was not operationalized, 
but only attributed a priori to community energy actors.  
The European Commission (EC), assisted by the European Parliament9, has most recently 
“discovered” the added value that local community energy can provide. In its proposal for 
the Recast Electricity Directive the EC defines local energy communities (LEC) in the 
following way (article2(6)): “Local energy community means: an association, a cooperative, 
a partnership, a nonprofit organisation or other legal entity which is effectively controlled 
by local shareholders or members, generally value rather than profit-driven, involved in 
distributed generation and in performing activities of a distribution system operator, 
                                             
 
8  See: https://www.fachagentur-windenergie.de/aktuell/detail/eu-praezisiert-de-minimis-
regelung.html  
9  Currently the Recast Renewable Energy Directives and the Recast Electricity Market Directive  - both essential 
part of the so-called Winter Package - are subject of the Trilogue between Commission, Council and 
Parliament. Both recast directives include definitions and special provisions for local (renewable) energy 
communities. Whereas the Commission and the Parliament strongly favor an enabling framework for 
community energy actors in their positions concerning theses directives, the Council’s amendments to the 
Commission’s proposals indeed rather pronounce the costs induced by community energy actors and their 
financial responsibility “… for the imbalances they cause in the system” (Council of the European Union 2017: 
62). 




supplier or aggregator at local level, including across borders.” (European Commission 2016: 
52, author’s emphasis). 
Thus, the Commission includes in its definition not only the various energy business activities 
a LEC can perform, but also declares “local control” and “value-driven” as key features 
making community energy actors distinct from other energy business actors. The added value 
for the European energy transformation process the EC attributes to LEC in its recitals for 
the recast electricity directive can be summarized as follows: LEC provide common goods: 
“Community energy […] help[s] fight energy poverty […] enables certain groups of household 
consumers to participate in the energy market […] Where they have been successfully 
operated such initiatives have delivered economic, social and environmental value to the 
community that goes beyond the mere benefits derived from the provision of energy 
services.” (ibid; recital 30).10   
Thus, citizen energy actors combine their energy business activities with a broader common 
good orientation in terms of local development, inclusive democracy, citizens’ engagement 
and social innovation. All of these contributions are increasingly needed to counteract the 
observable loss in acceptance and the growing strength of populism not only with regard to 
energy issues.  
However, attributing these contributions in legislation to a rather narrowly defined group of 
actors such as in the German definition of citizens’ energy companies does not seem to be 
adequate. It excludes a couple of well-known other decentralized initiatives as the 
municipality-based 100% Energy Regions or certain municipal utilities and other actors which 
include common good provisions into their energy business activities (Beermann and Tews 
2017). Moreover, it seems questionable whether the provision of those common goods that 
help raise acceptance can be realized via a definition of privileges for a defined category of 
actors. It will always be difficult – as evidenced by the German auctions – to find selective 
criteria to define the eligible actors that are not vulnerable for “abuse”. 
If acceptance is perceived as a result of the provision of those common goods as regional 
development, participation, the experience of self-efficacy as well as social inclusion of 
vulnerable people, then it seems to be more appropriate to change the bid evaluation 
criteria, i.e. the criteria defining how bids are awarded.  
                                             
 
10    Additionally, the EC seems to perceive another function of LEC, which I will mention here although it 
addresses another issue, that is not relevant for the very specific argumentation in this paper. The EC assumes 
LEC also as providers of innovations regarding decentralized approaches to balance demand and supply 
(related to the “security of supply“-issue): “Local energy communities can be an efficient way of managing 
energy at community level by consuming the electricity they generate […] with or without a connection to 
distribution systems (European Commission 2016: 7/8). This statement becomes even more relevant, when 
considering that the Commission additionally has “discovered” the local level, respectively the distribution 
system operator, to assume balancing responsibility and to “[…] to manage some of the challenges associated 
with variable generation more locally […], [in order to] “[…] significantly reduce network costs” (ibid.: 7-9). 




Currently, the bid selection in the German scheme works as a price-only selection process, 
comparable to the majority of auction schemes in the EU. However, there are examples of 
multi-criteria approaches to select the winning bids in order to pursue multiple policy goals 
(e.g. Wigand et al. 2016). In France for example, the bid evaluation in the PV auctions is 
based on the offered price (two thirds) and the environmental impact in the form of the 
panels’ carbon footprint (one third). The German solar branch has repeatedly referred to 
the French approach as more suitable than the German price-only-approach, because it 
better protects domestic producers of solar panels as they perform better with the 
environmental criteria then their competitors for non-European countries.  
Another example is the South-African “Renewable Energy Independent Power Project 
Procurement Program” that strongly relies on non-price factors in bid evaluation. The bid 
price counts for 70 percent, whereas the remaining 30 percent are given to a “composite 
score covering job creation, local content, ownership, management control, preferential 
procurement, enterprise development and socioeconomic development” (Eberhard et al. 
2014). 
Including these secondary objectives into the bid evaluation criteria means – of course – 
compromising on the economic efficiency of auction schemes. It clearly increases costs for 
bidders and the regulator in evaluating these bids. However, in most of the countries where 
these secondary objectives have been applied in bid evaluation, they helped to promote 
social acceptability of RE expansion policy and local economic development (Wigand et al. 
2016: 39).  
Whether to exempt those projects which are assumed to provide such added value from 
competitive auctions altogether or whether to include these objectives into bid evaluation 
criteria, depends on a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis, which goes beyond the mere 
consideration of static cost efficiency. If the proclaimed “secondary” objectives of the 
German auction scheme are more than just lip service, then policy makers have to devote 
more attention to them. 
Having in mind the increasing share of citizens who feel disconnected to their political elites 
in Germany as well as in other countries of the European Union – and energy transition 
mirrors that development – it becomes clear that addressing public welfare and social 
inclusion have to be key objectives of further energy transition effort.   
The added value provided so far by community energy actors – including municipalities, 
cooperatives and other decentralized community-based actors – in the form of 
democratization of energy business, opening opportunities to experience social self-efficacy, 
local development and social inclusion should be honored by democratic policy makers facing 
growing voter’s mistrust and populist political competitors.  
It will not suffice to think only in terms of providing a level playing field in energy related 
economic activities in an imperfect market for purely competition concerns. Instead, there 




is a need to create a level playing field for common-good-oriented visions and paradigms on 
societal and energy transition trajectories.  
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